We report results of a field study of the process by which a Canadian publicly-traded company and prospective auditors acquire information about each other and enter an engagement. We obtained documents from the company (including a request for proposal and minutes of audit committee meetings) and bids submitted by audit firms. We also interviewed senior company officers and all prospective audit partners to learn what each party wanted to know about the other, and how they obtained the information they sought. We observed: (1) the audit committee was involved in the process, but management effectively controlled the selection of the external auditor; (2) management gathered detailed information about prospective auditors, but the auditors were reluctant to press the client for information; (3) auditors provided references from senior officers of current clients, and repeatedly demonstrated responsiveness and commitment to management; and (4) auditors engaged in intense price competition. Implications for audit quality and auditor independence are discussed.
INTRODUCTION
Corporate financial reporting occurs in a regulated regime that requires public companies to have their financial statements audited by a licensed audit firm. In this study, we examine the first phase of the auditor-client interaction process to understand how audit firms and prospective clients learn about and select each other. Specifically, we are interested in the information exchange that occurs between prospective clients and auditors. How do auditors convey their competence and overall fit with the client, and ultimately convince the client to choose them?
Likewise, we examine how clients signal their integrity, competence and control in financial reporting, as well as their service needs and preferences to prospective auditors. In recent years, there have been calls for mandatory rotation of audit firms which would increase the frequency of this auditor-client matching process. This field study of the important initial matching phase complements the extant auditing literature focused primarily on later stages of the audit, such as planning, testing, quality control and reporting (Nelson and Tan 2005) .
Proposals for regulatory reforms typically assume that the relevant information required for this matching process is readily available-perhaps even common knowledge-to the contracting agents (Antle 1982) . However, as Hayek (1945) pointed out, one of the central tasks facing individual decision makers, markets and regulators is to acquire, aggregate and interpret the relevant information required to make effective economic decisions. Most such information is dispersed among members of society who have little incentive to reveal it to a central planner for fear that such revelation may be injurious to their own interests. Information dispersal, combined with conflicts between private and collective interest, is sand in the gearbox of wellintentioned reforms. Before deciding whether, and on what terms, they should engage each other, auditors and their prospective clients participate in a courtship to gather information about each other. We report results from an examination of this courtship process to better understand what and how information is collected by the parties involved.
In this field study, we investigate the exchange of information between prospective auditors and the client. We access confidential and detailed records obtained from companies (requests for proposal for providing audit services or RFPs, minutes of the meetings of the board of directors and the board's audit committee, and notes from executives' deliberations) as well as audit firms (bid proposals submitted in response to the RFPs). We supplement our examination of the documents through interviews with 18 individuals, including senior officers of the clients who issued the RFPs, and the audit partners who prepared the bids 1 .
Different disciplinary approaches to the same phenomenon choose different abstractions to attain useful insights. The purpose of this investigation is to do the opposite of abstractiondelving into the rich, diverse, and complex interactions between auditors and clients-by documenting some raw, grassroots observations that may serve as inputs into more familiar, traditional analyses. Detailed observation in accounting research is exemplified by Beasley et al. (2009) on audit committees, Hirst and Koonce (1996) on audit analytical procedures, and Hilton and O'Brien (2009) on asset impairment. We follow the spirit of the call by Hopwood (2007) that more detailed studies should be conducted to understand accounting and auditing in their natural contexts.
We highlight several interesting features of our case study. The RFP arose from the implementation of the Canadian regulatory mandate to rotate audit partners. A change of 1 We collected detailed data on two main organizations: a publicly traded company and a government agency. We also obtained less detailed data (limited to written RFPs and bid proposals) on five clients from one Big 4 firm. In the current paper, we only report results from the publicly traded company, which was the primary case we studied. Adding the other case studies reinforces the findings of the current case, but does not add any other significant insights.
engagement partner caused by audit partner rotation rules led the client to put the audit up for bid and, ultimately, to change the audit firm. The audit committee chair and the CFO said independently that a major reason for putting the audit up for bid was the availability at other firms of senior audit partners with relevant industry experience who were rotating off other engagements in the same industry. 2 Proponents of audit partner and audit firm rotation claim benefits such as greater audit objectivity (Tan 1995) from the policy. Our case study has the potential to provide evidence on the effectiveness of such benefits. Second, our case study involves a prestigious, growing, successful organization targeted by Big 4 firms as a desirable client. Studies of risk management, and especially of client acceptance, tend to focus on riskier and less desirable clients (e.g., Johnstone and Bedard 2003) . The study of desirable clients has the potential to broaden our understanding of auditor-client interaction processes. One major issue in the auditing literature is to differentiate whether large audit clients receive more scrutiny and hence higher audit quality, or whether economic dependence impairs auditor independence (Francis and Yu 2009 ). Our examination of how an auditor courts a desirable client can shed some light on concerns about auditor independence.
We find that the audit committee provided oversight in the auditor selection process, though management dominated the information gathering process and selection decision. Since the presumed intent of legislation such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX hereafter) was to empower the audit committee vis-à-vis management, we had expected the audit committee to own the auditor selection process. Instead, our case study revealed that management controlled the process of selecting the auditor. Importantly, management was the main producer and gatherer of information and controlled what, when, and how it was distributed to the audit committee and auditors. In addition, we examine the information production and gathering activities of the auditor in courting the prospective client. Auditors struggled to differentiate themselves through technical expertise; hence, relationship building was critical to success in the courtship process. However, the effort that auditors invested to establish relationships, show commitment, and demonstrate cultural fit raises concerns about their consequences for independence. We also observe significant differences in proposed audit fees by competing auditors. In one proposal, a Big 4 audit firm transferred significant decision making authority over audit planning to the client by offering a selection of levels off audit hours and staff seniority in return for a higher audit fee. Our study illustrates how the auditor selection process potentially undermines many of the claims of benefits that may flow from audit rotation.
Section II of the paper outlines the RFP process and develops the framework we use to analyze the auditor-client interaction leading up to engagement of an auditor. Section III describes the method used to gather data. Section IV recounts the pre-courting activities amongst auditors and the prospective client prior to the issuance of the RFP; Section V describes the process of exchanging information in a formal manner as set out in the RFP; Section VI reports on how auditors demonstrate commitment and cultural fit to the client; and Section VII illustrates the client's final deliberations and actions in selecting the auditor. Section VIII contains a summary and discussion of the findings.
II. FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS OF THE AUDITOR SELECTION PROCESS
We analyze the RFP process by investigating phases in which information was produced, gathered and used by client management, the audit committee and auditors to decide on an engagement. We divide the auditor selection process we observed into four phases: 1) precourting; 2) formal information exchange; 3) demonstrations of commitment and fit; and (4) We describe each phase and outline our expectations about information exchange and usage by auditors, client management and the audit committee in the following paragraphs.
Pre-courting
The pre-courting phase occurs before the client issues an RFP for audit services.
Historically, auditors were prohibited by professional codes of conduct from soliciting clients because it was believed to impair the formers' independence, allow clients to do opinion shopping and undercut the authority and fees of the incumbent auditor. In 1979, under threat of antitrust charges, these restrictions were removed from the professional code of conduct and audit firms became free to solicit clients and employees and to advertise. All Big 4 firms run formal programs to identify, target, and cultivate a set of desired audit clients. We, therefore, expect all Big 4 firms to solicit audit committee members who are formally and directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the auditors.
Formal information exchange
Beginning with the client's issuance of the RFP, a structured and planned exchange of information takes place among client management, the auditors and the audit committee. This information is captured primarily through documentation, including the RFP document and client records, planned meetings and presentations, and auditor proposal documents. The RFP guides direct clients to provide background information and describe the scope of services required. The guides also recommend that clients request specific items from prospective auditors: statements on independence and conflict of interest; a description of audit methodology; profiles of expertise by rank and location; transition plans; evidence of a strong reputation; a multiple-year fee quote; and demonstrations of commitment and distinctiveness. The client specified a 30-page limit for auditor proposals.
Prospective auditors have very limited time to understand a large and complex organization after an RFP is issued. We expect the auditors to follow their client acceptance and risk management practices by carefully scrutinizing internal company information provided by the prospective client (Johnstone and Bedard 2003) . The RFP guides also recommend that the auditor interview senior members of the management, and all audit committee members.
The audit pricing literature suggests that a key variable in this decision process is city and national level audit expertise in the client's industry. We, therefore, expect the auditors to devote considerable effort to highlight their industry expertise in the local market. We also expect the incumbent auditor to bid the same fee as the previous year's, and the other auditors to devote much of their information gathering activity to ascertain the client's fee and related service expectations, always mindful of the possibility that one or more auditors might submit a lowball fee (DeAngelo 1981) . The RFP guides recommend that the auditor be asked to provide a breakdown of audit hours by personnel rank and financial statement account. Developing a realistic time budget requires the auditor to understand the quality of the prospective clients'
internal controls, quality of accounting policies, risk areas requiring extensive audit work, competence of financial staff, and actual and potential differences of opinion with the current auditor. One final variable is the reputation of the audit firm. The audit firm guides suggest that the auditors be asked to provide references from clients in the same industry who can provide feedback on service quality attributes. We, therefore, expect the audit firm to select audit committee members of their current clients to serve as references.
Demonstrating commitment and fit
The RFP guides recommend that the auditor be asked to demonstrate commitment and Another method auditors might use to distinguish themselves from their competition is through pricing (DeAngelo 1981) . We expect prospective auditors to compete on audit fees in anticipation of the client's preference for the lowest proposed fee. The incumbent auditor has likely exhausted the depths of its technical industry resources on the client and might not be in a position to lowball the fee. Therefore, we expect the incumbent to emphasize depth of client knowledge and transition costs of auditor switching.
A third method of demonstrating distinctiveness is through providing non-audit services.
Excellence in tax, information systems auditing or other service needs of the client could be used by auditors to signal their distinctive capabilities.
Selection decision
In choosing an auditor, the client gathers information both formally as well as informally.
We expect the audit committee, in accordance with its responsibilities under SOX, to establish the process to be followed in selecting the auditor and to ensure compliance with the selection process. While the audit committee should solicit management's assessment of the prospective auditors, we expect the audit committee to follow stock exchange listing requirements (e.g., NYSE and TSX) and current best practices. The RFP guides suggest that the audit committee hold an in camera meeting to deliberate over auditor selection and make the final appointment decision.
III. METHOD
To develop an understanding of the auditor-client courtship, we obtained RFP records from a publicly traded company (the prospective client) and all participating audit firms, and interviewed individuals involved in the process. We informed participants that we were conducting a study of the information and understanding produced through the RFP process.
Overview of the client
The client is a large (>$10 Billion in assets) Canadian company that issued an RFP for external auditor services for the fiscal year 2008. The client is listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and is in an industry subject to federal regulation. The client's management is widely admired by the business community and has a track record of consistent growth in sales and profit. The client pays its directors a 100 percent premium for service on the audit committee relative to other board committee members. The Chair of the audit committee also receives a 100 percent premium above the retainer fees of the other chairs of board committees. The audit committee meets more frequently than all other committees, and all members had a 100 percent attendance record during 2008. This pattern is consistent with the best performance of U.S.
company audit committee compensation practices documented by Engel et al. (2009) .
The RFP document and bid process
The client's RFP describes the engagement, lists auditor selection committee members, and outlines the communication process, including deadlines for responses and page limits.
Respondents were required to address specific topics, including firm expertise, transition, rapport and cultural fit. The RFP was sent out by the client to the Big 4 audit firms (Auditors 1-4, and to no others). The incumbent (Auditor 1), a Big 4 firm, had audited the client for over 25 years and was included in the RFP. The RFP covered audits as well as reviews of the client and its subsidiaries but did not include tax or other advisory services. Audit firms were, however, invited to provide information on their tax and advisory services. Upon signing a confidentiality agreement, prospective auditors were invited to enter into an information acquisition process.
The client provided access to private and public documents in a -data room‖ and made executives available to discuss any issues with the bidders.
For illustrative purposes, Table 1 details the timeline and records of the RFP process for the client.
Insert c. We interviewed the chief financial officer (CFO) and the chair of the audit committee of the client. Each 60-90 minute interview followed a script we developed based on information items requested in the RFP document, as well as the researchers' experience and review of literature. The interviewees were provided with a copy of the script prior to the interview. 3 We used the script as a guideline for interviews, allowing the interviewees and ourselves to pursue interesting avenues as they arose. These interviews were also recorded and handwritten notes were taken during the interview. f. Finally, we interviewed a U.S. based Big 4 firm head office partner (hereafter, the U.S.
partner) who specialized in preparing bid proposals submitted by his firm in response to
RFPs. We asked him to comment on our findings from Canada and identify similarities and differences from normal practice in the U.S.
The documents and information gathered in the study are summarized in Table 2 .
Insert Table 2 about here
IV. PRE-COURTING
"There are processes and there are structures, but people do business with people."
---Managing Partner, Big 4 accounting firm
The interviews revealed that the issuance of the RFPs by the company was not the beginning of the courtship. All four invited auditors had known that the RFP was coming well before it was issued. All non-incumbent audit firms had active business development processes through which they had already targeted the company as an enterprise they wanted to serve. As we expected, Auditor 1 (the incumbent) considered the chair of the audit committee to be the key decision maker at the client and concentrated most communication and relationship building activities on him.
The remaining three auditors chose a different route to pre-courting. These three auditors visited the senior managers of the client in their offices and invited them to dinners and presentations in order to express their interest, exchange information and develop personal rapport well before the issuance of the RFP. This early courting behavior reinforces the idea that these auditors perceived the client's senior managers (i.e., the CEO, CFO), and not the audit committee or its chair, as the key decision makers in this process. In response to our query, the U.S. partner also indicated that the -C-Suite‖, that is, the CFO and Controller, and sometimes the CEO, would be the usual target of the pre-courting activities in the U.S. However, the U.S.
partner was careful to acknowledge that the audit committee would formally appoint the auditors.
V. FORMAL INFORMATION EXCHANGE
The RFP document outlines the information the client expects to obtain about the auditors and use in its selection decision. In addition, the RFP specifies a protocol for the prospective auditors to gather information from the client. We spotlight our findings on key areas where the responses went beyond the exchange of boilerplate statements: background information; independence and conflict of interest; expertise; auditor reputation; and audit fees.
Sharing Background Information
The client exerted much effort in acquiring information to reduce uncertainty about the prospective auditors, while the auditors hesitated to make too many requests of the client and proceeded to submit the proposal in the face of uncertainty. The client was quite assertive in obtaining critical answers. For example, the client wanted to know the auditors' reasoning and processes for arriving at critical accounting estimates and judgments. The client also wanted to be certain that there were no accounting policy differences between the company and the auditor, especially any that might lead to a restatement. To quote the client's audit committee chair: -We
were very concerned about making sure that they believed they[the auditors] knew enough of the company's results, and the company's transactions, to ensure that they did not view the risk of restatement as being even a low probability. We wanted to clear that outright from the start.‖
On the other hand, auditors appear to have submitted their bids without paying much attention to internal control weaknesses of the client reported in the most recent management letter from the incumbent auditor. Interviews revealed that many clients do not furnish such information to bidders. Although management letters issued by Auditor 1 (the incumbent) for the last two years were available to them in the data room, two of the three non-incumbent auditors stated that they had not read them. Furthermore, auditors did not investigate the details of accounting adjustments and reporting issues raised by the incumbent auditor, nor whether these items were booked or carried forward to future periods. Even though the prospective auditors shared the client's concern about restatements, the auditor did not closely examine the client's internal documents. The U.S. partner indicated that, prior to entering into an engagement, he wanted to understand significant transactions and their accounting treatment to reduce the likelihood of a subsequent restatement. He felt confident that he could identify potential accounting issues by reviewing the public filings by the client, specifically the financial statements and the notes, and discussing significant transactions with management. Furthermore, the partner preferred to discuss restatement concerns during the proposal process, so as not to surprise the client later in the engagement.
Auditors also showed limited interest in an assessment of the internal control system of the client, and assumed internal control must be adequate since the company was subject to oversight by the industry regulator. Although they had the right to do so, auditors in both Canada and the U.S. felt that they could not ask the client for certain items, such as the schedule of unadjusted errors. They asked management indirect questions to gauge the number of items that came up for negotiation, and used the number of issues to estimate the severity or materiality of differences with the incumbent auditor. Auditors did not ask to see correspondence with the federal regulator on accounting related issues, internal reports that had been prepared for the board and audit committee, or breakdowns of how the incumbent auditor allocated its staff time.
One audit partner explained: -Company X would be such a big frog in a small pond for any of the audit firms that I can understand why they probably all had the attitude of we don't care how ugly it is, we want the brand and we want the business."
Auditor efforts were centered on personal meetings and conversations to understand the client, build a relationship, and sell their services. Attention was focused less on what is documented on paper, and more on cues from interpersonal encounters with the individuals involved in the engagement. This observation does not disconfirm prior research on auditors' risk considerations, but suggests that the information is drawn from interpersonal, rather than documentary, sources. It appears that in order to assess and manage risk, the auditors focused on trying to better assess senior management's candor, forthrightness, competence and integrity.
Results of the interview with the U.S. partner were similar to those conducted with Canadian partners. The description of the process, which was mostly oral, and types of questions asked by the U.S. partner were very similar to the process description and questions asked by the Canadian partners. Rather than relying on historical information presented in documents, auditors form a picture of how their future relationship with the prospective client might unfold by relying on their personal judgments from interacting with the key management personnel.
Independence and Conflict of Interest
The RFP guides affirm the importance of asking auditors about independence and conflicts of interest. The RFP guides also recommend that the auditor be asked about any relationships with competitors and the participants in the company's supply chain. The questions and answers in the case we examined about independence appeared to be boilerplate. All Big 4 firms were already providing one or more services to the company, though none of them included any discussions about potential conflicts in their proposals. The company was deemed to know about these services, so no mention was made in writing by the auditors.
Client management also sought to reinforce its intra-industry links through the auditor. Expertise A key recommendation of the RFP guides is to seek information on prospective auditors' industry expertise. As we expected, the auditors responded by assembling an audit team with relationship partners, engagement partners, managers, and audit staff. All senior personnel, regardless of office location, had industry specific experience which was profiled in detail. Key industry specialists from head office, tax partners, and the lead information technology partner were also introduced to the client. The auditors dedicated 5-12 pages (of the 30-page limit) to staff profiles in their proposals, including lengthy descriptions of their industry specific experience. Consistent with the client's RFP demands, auditors also provided extensive descriptions on the firm's industry-specific market share regionally and globally. In addition, auditors introduced several industry-specific clients in the proposals as references. All bids listed an extensive set of thought leadership resources provided by the firm, including forums, websites, roundtables, e-mail alerts and a variety of industry-specific publications. These strategies are consistent with common practices suggested by the U.S. partner, who stressed the importance of demonstrating expertise through industry leadership and knowledge resources.
In their proposals, auditors also highlighted industry-specific community involvement.
The client especially valued membership of audit firm personnel on advisory committees in the relevant industry associations or regulatory bodies; all auditors responded by including team members with these credentials in their proposals. These activities were perceived as keeping the auditor at the leading edge of recent developments. To further demonstrate experience and expertise, auditors included industry peers of the client as references.
While it was conceptually possible to attempt a ranking of auditors in terms of industryspecific expertise, it was clear to all participants that all four bidders had good technical expertise and could perform a satisfactory audit of this client. The formidable amount of technical skill and resources may help set apart the Big 4 firms from the smaller audit firms. However, among the Big 4 firms, expertise became largely neutralized as a differentiating factor in the client's selection of an auditor. The evaluation forms and written correspondence among the client's management and audit committee showed the firms closely bunched together in industry expertise scores. The client's CFO said: -We all unanimously felt that every firm could do the job very well with the team they had presented.‖ Furthermore, during interviews, one of the audit partners expressed frustration that, in a highly standardized accounting environment, it was hard for an audit firm to differentiate itself from its competitors, and therefore, the firm asking the lowest price often wins the job.
Auditor Reputation
The RFP guides recommend that the client assess auditor reputation by asking for (1) the regulatory peer review report and the audit firm's response, (2) civil and criminal litigation and the amount of liability insurance coverage, and (3) client references who can be contacted to assess service quality.
The client was clearly interested in any lawsuits against the auditor and whether they might distract the auditor and/or create a reputation risk for the company. However, these questions were asked orally, not in writing. Furthermore, management contacted all client references, and even reached out through informal channels to other industry colleagues (mainly controllers and CFOs) who were not included in the list of references in the proposals, to form an impression of each prospective audit partner. Management did not ask for results of Canadian Public Accountability Board (CPAB) reports, which are issued privately to registered audit firms.
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For the client, it was clear that the CFO and the audit committee chair interpreted auditor reputation as the engagement partners' personal reputations with other clients in the industry.
The choice of referees surprised us. Auditors overwhelmingly chose -C-Suite‖ executives as referees (approximately 75 percent of referees were CFOs and only one was an audit committee chair). All the prospective audit partners (and the U.S. partner) indicated that they attempt to identify the key decision maker and choose references accordingly.
One particular dimension of reputation that interested the client was whether other CFOs classified the auditor as being rigid (undesirable) or flexible (desirable). Rigid was described as issuing edicts (undesirable) versus discussing rationale (desirable) for accounting treatment of an event or transaction. The audit committee chair said: -The most important issue for us is their reputation; that we can discern by references on how they operate with other companies in our industry.‖ We saw no evidence of reputation with investors or any third party users of financial statements being considered in auditor selection. Auditors' reliance on references from management, rather than audit committees, of their current clients to get future clients is potentially troubling for auditor independence; this reliance on client management may incline auditors to gain their favor as references.
Fees
The client's RFP calls for bids for the first two years of the audit engagement. The twoyear bid places a constraint on the ability of auditors to lowball the fees in order to win the engagement. We use the incumbent's fee for the current year audit as a benchmark, as this fee reflects a deep knowledge of the client, assessment of associated risks and the extent of audit work necessary for the engagement. This benchmark fee would best reflect the literature on determinants of audit pricing (Bedard and Johnstone 2004; Johnstone and Bedard, 2001; Choi et al. 2008) . Variation in pricing is studied by Beck and Barefield (1986) , who suggest that bidding auditors' judgments about the prospective engagement will differ. For the client, we observed that bids for total engagement fee ranged from materially below to materially above the current fee. The successful firm's bid was materially below the current fee, even though management had stressed repeatedly that lowering the fee was not a major motivation for issuing the RFP.
That the incumbent auditor would bid 100 percent of the publicly disclosed current fee was the consensus expectation among the non-incumbent auditors, and this common knowledge proved to be accurate.
Although the RFP voiced a preference for greater involvement of senior auditors in the work, the low (winning) bidder proposed higher staff hours and lower partner/manager hours relative to the incumbent's current year time budget. In the interviews, both the audit committee chair and the CFO of the client expressed some concern that a low bid meant the auditor might All audit firms had developed a table breaking down fees by rank and financial statement cycle, (e.g., sales, receivables), and auditors claimed that estimating the total required hours was important in determining their fee, though the client appeared not to have paid much attention to these numbers in making the engagement decision. The RFP indicated that future billings for audit fees had to identify each person by rank, hours worked, and the hourly rate quoted in the proposal (bid). This practice was supported by the RFP guides.
Interestingly, Auditor 4 submitted bids for three different levels of audit service. In addition to the middle bid for marginally higher than the current fee, the other two bids were 5 Auditor 4 submitted three different levels of fees and hours (discussed later in more detail). 6 -Because clients do not monitor the number of hours their auditors spend on the assignment, the hourly billing rate is not a meaningful measure of price. The total price of the audit assignment-the price of buying the audit certificate-is the relevant price variable. ‖ Sunder (1997, pp. 117-8) .
priced at materially above and marginally below the current fee. The premium-priced service offered a more experienced partner and staff on the engagement, more audit hours, and many other ‗non-audit related' items such as more frequent meetings, more -free‖ time to consult on issues, more customer satisfaction discussions, and more industry and strategy related discussions with experts from the head office. The discounted fee option required extensive work commitment from the client's internal audit department, less audit hours from the external auditor, a less experienced partner, less experienced staff, less frequent meetings and fewer advisory discussions. This audit firm had effectively offered to hand control over key audit planning decisions such as budget hours and staffing to the client.
We were also surprised by the explicit pricing of different levels of experience within rank (e.g., among partners) in an audit engagement bid. In professional service markets where services are sold to retail customers, it is common to see differential pricing based on the service provider's experience. For example, in Lasik eye surgery, the price increases with the number of operations that an eye surgeon has performed. Whether audit firms can do better by such partnerlevel differentiation, as opposed to relying on the firm's brand name and a single billing rate for all audit partners, is an interesting and open question. In this case, the multiple billing options created confusion, and the attempt to explicitly price the experience of team members backfired and undermined the credibility of the audit firm. When commenting on the proposal with multiple prices, the client's audit committee chair said: -I think at the end result that was
probably a mistake on their part…I don't care for that type of stuff… I didn't think the idea of having an audit firm where the service you get depends on how much you pay is really the impression that they would want to give.‖
From our discussions with auditors, it was clear that they had extensive knowledge about their competitors' bids and awareness of the three-level pricing approach described above. While the CFO claimed to have provided limited feedback, the auditors had detailed knowledge about what the winning bidder had done well, as well as details of other auditors' bids. One possibility is that, since all four bidders were hired to provide one service or another needed by the client, they might have gleaned additional insight into the process and actions of their competitors from interactions with client personnel after the RFP process was over. Audit firms found it difficult to differentiate themselves due to time restrictions, common knowledge of competitor actions, and structure imposed by the client on the RFP process. It is difficult for an audit firm to extract much benefit from introducing innovations if they become common knowledge almost immediately through extensive feedback in this process.
VI. DEMONSTRATING COMMITMENT AND FIT
The neutralization of expertise as a differentiating variable rendered demonstrating commitment and cultural fit an important part of the courtship process. Interviews with management and incumbent Auditor 1 indicated that the client had been dissatisfied with the -bedside manner‖ of the engagement partner who had taken over the audit in the preceding year as a result of mandatory rotation of engagement personnel within the audit firm. Management also had other wishes that it does not express in the RFP document. They wanted the auditor to identify and respond to a very specific need revealed in the interviews with management and the selection of the winning bid-the client wished to be treated like a first tier client.
Accordingly, three of the four audit firms tried to convince the client they understood this implicit desire by designating the firm's national CEO as the relationship partner and ensuring his presence at the oral presentation 7 , and through relocation of industry expertise. The client was open to having an engagement partner and/or substantial part of audit team expertise brought in from another city. As a significant gesture of commitment to the client, Auditor 3 proposed to move a partner with industry experience, and Auditor 2 proposed to move a senior manager with industry experience, to the city of the client's head office. The U.S. partner also suggested moving a partner to the head office city of a client as a way of showing auditor commitment. The movement of experts into the local office is consistent with reported findings in the audit pricing literature, which show that premium audit pricing is largely driven by expertise at the local office level (Ferguson et al., 2003) .
Mirroring the client
Mirroring the client was a second mechanism to make a case for commitment. Imitating the style, dress, appearance, and manners of those one wishes to please is a deliberate strategy as old as human history (Gremler and Gwinner 2008) . One should not be surprised to find that the auditors, too, employ such tactics in courting prospective clients. Their written proposals reveal that they tended to mirror the clients in various ways. The auditors overwhelmingly used CFOs as references, since they perceived the CFO to be the most important decision maker in the selection process. Furthermore, auditors adopted both the client mottos and slogans in developing their proposals and presentations in their attempts to show a fit between their organizations with respect to culture, thinking, and attitudes. By infusing the client slogans into their dialogue, auditors attempted to show that they had good chemistry with the client and resonated with the clients' values. Management encouraged this auditor response, with the CFO emphasizing the message of fit that came across in oral presentations, and wishing to "be able to
call the [engagement partner] up and talk the same language."
What does it take to be a good independent auditor of a given client? Competence and absence of a prior relationship immediately come to mind. However, in our investigation, we observed a strong relationship orientation in both Canadian and U.S. auditors. Specifically, having a prior relationship with the prospective client appears to be an important pre-requisite to be put on the audit team in the first place. Interviews with audit partners revealed that a critical factor in developing their proposals was assembling a team with not only industry experts and firm leadership, but also with established client relationships. This relationship preference was not limited to the engagement partner but percolated down all the way to the junior auditors.
Audit firms tend to see auditing as a -relationship‖ business, and were interested in assigning people to their teams who already knew and had a relationship with the management of the prospective client. Furthermore, the interview with the U.S. partner revealed that auditors seriously consider the RFP process itself as a relationship-building opportunity whose payoff may arrive in another engagement months or years later. The importance of prior relationship, all the way to junior auditors, surprised us.
Demonstration of the decision-making protocol
When being courted by the Big 4 auditors, clients must consider how the relationship between the local team and the head office might affect the engagement. The RFP guide recommends that clients request the auditors to describe their mechanism to resolve accounting issues with the client as a part of their audit approach. The client made it clear that they wanted all accounting issues to be resolved with the engagement partner and not with the audit firm's head office. Entrepreneurial firms tend to be impatient with rules imposed by distant bureaucracies and would rather trust a person they know. The client wanted to understand the reasoning of the audit partner who has final decision making authority. In the aftermath of the collapse of Enron and Arthur Andersen, LLP, this insistence on local partner autonomy is a sensitive issue for the Big 4 audit firms. However, audit partners in both Canada and the U.S.
thought it was reasonable for the client to prefer autonomy of the engagement partner.
One Research studies indicate that having a technical head office partner involved in the negotiation is beneficial to the audit firm (Gibbins et al. 2001) . Likewise, team negotiation has been found to be more effective than individual negotiation in many accountability related contexts (O'Connor 1997). Our study illustrates that auditors appear to be split on the benefits of involving head office technical experts in their client communication and negotiation processes.
VII. SELECTION

Audit committee involvement
The client is a publicly traded company listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) and regulated by the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC). As a publicly traded company, regulations require the client to have an audit committee. Recommending the selection of the independent external auditor to the board of directors is one of the committee's key functions.
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According to the website of the AICPA Audit Committee Effectiveness Centre: -With the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), audit committees now ‗own' the relationship between the independent auditor and the organization.‖ We therefore expected the audit committee to run and play a central role in the selection process.
Our examination of the auditor engagement process revealed that management controlled most aspects of the auditor selection process and decision, including all communication and the flow of information to both the audit committee and the bidding firms. The RFP was sent out to auditors by the CFO with the approval of the audit committee. The process we observed is inconsistent with the -best practice‖ that we had expected, in which the audit committee would establish contact with the prospective audit firms, or at least the cover letter would be jointly signed by the CFO and audit committee chair, as suggested by the RFP guides.
The client set up an auditor selection committee to oversee the RFP process. The selection committee included six company executives, including the CEO and the CFO, all listed in the RFP by name and position. The audit committee chair was listed by name, while the remaining audit committee members were only listed as -Members of the audit committee‖ in a 9 -An audit committee must recommend to the board of directors the external auditor to be nominated for the purpose of preparing or issuing an auditor's report…‖ Ontario Securities Commission Multilateral Instrument 52-110 Section 2.3(2)(a). This is consistent with the rules prescribed in the US under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.
single line. In the RFP document, the client's VP Finance was the single point of contact for auditor inquiries and site visits, and no contact information was provided for the audit committee chair or other members of the audit committee. The respondents to the RFP were explicitly prohibited from any direct contact with any officer or director of the client under threat of disqualification.
The interviews revealed that the chair, but no other members of the audit committee, met individually with each firm for 30 minutes. No meeting between the prospective auditors and the audit committee as a whole was held without the presence of company executives. 10 The RFP guide recommends that, in addition to various management personnel, all audit committee members be made available to meet individually with prospective audit firms. In our case study, the audit committee members had no opportunity to meet individually with prospective auditors.
Our examination of records of the meetings and correspondence reveal the following process at the client. After signing a confidentiality agreement, auditors were given access to a data room which had both public and private client information (see Appendix A for a list of data items provided). A set of executives and the audit committee chair were made available for interview by appointment. Then, the auditors submitted written proposals to provide audit services to the client. The written proposals were evaluated and summarized by the CFO and VP Finance. Copies of the written proposals, together with the CFO's summary evaluation, were then provided to all members of the selection committee (which consisted of senior managers and the audit committee). Auditors were invited to make oral presentations to the selection committee. All members of the selection committee attended the oral presentations.
The selection committee held a half-hour discussion following each auditor presentation.
An evaluation form was developed by the CFO and provided to selection committee members to rank the four bidding firms based on their proposals and presentations. Selection committee members were also asked to evaluate all bidding audit firms, using a three-point scale, on a set of relevant attributes that were aligned with the RFP (e.g., knowledge of business, people, relationship, organization fit, commitment, audit methodology, other services, and fees). The audit committee chair and other selection committee members provided additional qualitative comments on each auditor to the CFO, and requested a recommendation from management.
Subsequently, the CFO, in collaboration with the VP Finance, compiled the evaluation forms and produced a scorecard for each firm containing detailed criteria and justification for every score.
The six management members of the selection committee held a meeting to select the top two candidates. Afterward, they examined the CFO's summary of the pros and cons of the two finalist firms to arrive at a recommendation. The audit committee accepted the recommendation, and forwarded its recommendation to the board and the shareholders. The timeline in Table 1 shows a six-day interval during which auditors made their presentation to the selection committee and the board approved the change of auditor, with the audit committee and board meetings being held on the same day.
While the audit committee of the client followed the letter of the Ontario Securities Commission rule of recommending the auditor to the board, its influence on the selection process can hardly be described as -owning‖ the process as suggested by the audit guides. All auditors interviewed said that their level of engagement with the audit committee of this client was better than average, and audit committees are not usually the driver of this process.
The audit committee oversees the courtship
It appears that the audit committee's -ownership‖ of the auditor-client relationship took the form of attaining a certain level of comfort with the auditor selection process. Though they did not drive the selection decision, our case suggests that audit committees participate in meetings with prospective audit partners, assess their suitability, and offer their assessment. This level of involvement is consistent with the substantive practices reported by Beasley et al. (2009) , in which the audit committee has some input in selecting the audit partner. Furthermore, our observations confirm the speculation of an auditor interviewed by Gendron and Bédard (2006) , who conjectures that management drives the selection process by giving the audit committee a recommendation, along with all rationale that supports the desired auditor. An audit committee member in the same study surmises that the audit committee would not have the power to reverse management's decision about engaging an auditor. In a more recent U.S. field study, Cohen, Krishnamoorthy and Wright (2009) report that management is perceived as the dominant force in auditor hiring/firing decisions, with one audit partner saying that the audit committee and auditor understand the audit committee's responsibility, but acknowledge management's influence in practice. One of the audit partners in our study lamented the fact that the audit committee had asked management for a recommendation. He felt that it would have been more appropriate to ask management for its assessment of the pros and cons of each audit firm, with the final decision made by the audit committee.
The Audit Committee Chair summarized the process as follows: -Our committee (AC) saw its primary role as one to ensure that a robust selection process was followed by the company, where the AC had substantive oversight, and had the final decision. We didn't see this role as requiring, or necessarily being compatible with, the AC actually conducting all work.‖
VIII. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
The company studied in this case study was a successful and highly desired client. The client had done its homework, developed an elaborate RFP, and engaged its internal stakeholders in a variety of meeting and rating exercises to determine its preferred auditor. In the courtship, the client wanted, expected, and received numerous gestures and promises from the audit firms, who all sought to show their commitment to providing good client service and responsiveness to management's needs. Management clearly knew its definition of audit quality-a partner with a reputation for working well with management, and visible signs of treatment as a preferred client (i.e., have access to the best expertise and attention from top management of the audit firm)-and how to get the information relevant to making its assessments and rank the prospective audit firms. While the audit committee was involved in the selection process, we had not expected that they would be so reliant on management to collect, evaluate and summarize information. At the end of the auditor-client courtship, the audit committee asked for, received, and endorsed the recommendation of management.
The auditors had also done their homework, and based their pre-courting behavior on the desirability of becoming the auditor of this company. It was troubling, however, to see the courtship emphasize repeated demonstrations of auditor commitment to the client, the audit partners' reliance on CFOs of current clients to vouch for them, and the reluctance of the prospective auditors to access, much less ask for more of, the crucial information for properly assessing risk (e.g., schedule of unadjusted errors). The power imbalance between the client and prospective auditors was unexpected and remains worrisome. The auditors had a surprisingly limited understanding of the underlying quality of the client's internal controls, the disagreements (if any) between the client and the incumbent auditor, and the unadjusted errors they might inherit upon the engagement as the new auditor. Though auditors had a good sense of how to serve the client, the client's quality of internal controls and future accounting problems remained opaque and not well understood. These results suggest that new auditors are not only more vulnerable to fraud (Treadway 1987) , but also to errors in the early years of an engagement (Johnson et al. 2002) . Perhaps difficulties encountered with new audit clients are partly due to the learning curve involved, but also due to lack of proper risk assessment during the client engagement process. Assessing management integrity and competence is necessary but not sufficient for proper risk management.
Each audit firm assembled a vast pool of expert talent, but still found it difficult to differentiate itself from its competitors on this dimension. One problem for the auditors was the client perception that all four audit firms had the capacity to do a good job on this engagement.
Audit firms therefore had to differentiate themselves through their pre-courting and courtship behavior by: bringing the national CEO to lead their presentations; being responsive to client desires for local expertise (e.g., offering to move an industry specialist partner to the head office city); mirroring the client in presentations of self and selection of referees; promising engagement partner autonomy; and lowering their fees. Inability of audit firms to create clear expertise-based differentiation, reliance on referrals from CFOs of current clients, and demonstrations of commitment raises concerns about auditor independence.
Auditor rotation has often been proposed as a way of preserving the independence of auditors from their clients. Rotation of auditors, either another engagement partner from the same firm, or-better still-a different firm, will bring a fresh set of eyes (Tan 1995) , fewer blinders, and uproot entrenched relationships that may override their objectivity and independence. There are also well-known arguments against rotation as time and repetition can help the auditor develop perspective and expertise (Arel et al. 2005 ).
This field investigation points us to another counterargument. The very process of engaging a new auditor, combined with competition in the market for audit services, encourages auditor actions that weaken their independence. Auditor rotation promotes perennial courtship by audit firms and ensures that this weakening of independence is repeated every few years.
Rotation affords clients the opportunity to avoid auditors who they don't like without having to fire them, and obscures opinion shopping motives for auditor switching that might otherwise raise red flags to capital markets and regulators (Lu 2006) . Rotation also puts pressure on auditors to demonstrate commitment and responsiveness to the management of prospective clients, as well as current clients used as referees, to win future engagements. Courtship behavior precedes and endures after the RFP process, making it difficult to find auditors who are not affiliated with management in some way or another at the time of RFP.
A rotation mandate requires an audit firm to have several industry-specific experts in at least the major local offices to properly audit large companies. The case indicates that even the Big 4 audit firms have difficulty maintaining such depth in all their local offices. This means that an audit partner rotation requirement will have the unintended effect of driving small-and medium-sized audit firms out of the market, and increase the concentration of the audit market.
Future research should explore the efficacy of reducing management's role and power in this courtship process. Regulators are considering having each audit partner sign his or her personal name on each audit. More research is needed to assess whether marketing an individual partner's name, as opposed to the firm's name, leads to better audit quality or merely serves to reduce the firm's control over the engagement partner. 
INTRODUCTION
X Company …At close to $XX billion in balance sheet assets and more than Y years of strong growth including XX percent over the last 12 months, the necessity to continually review business strategies and risks is paramount in ensuring sustained success.
Of late, there have been multiple and significant changes in accounting standards, regulations and the XYZ industry that have all combined to add a great deal of complexity to our business with no slowdown in sight. To name a few, the recent adoption of XYZ accounting standards, the upcoming implementation of the XYZ Industry regulations and the transition to IFRS over the next 5 years represent major changes to our business organization.
Against this backdrop, X company has determined it is timely to review the availability of [industry] audit expertise and resources in Canada and is undertaking a Request for Proposal (RFP) for independent audit services. This document outlines the general principles of the RFP. We highlight that our preference would include the most senior expertise to be based in Region of Canada, but it is not essential.
All information will be provided to you in strict confidence. Please complete the RFP Acceptance and Confidentiality Agreement (Appendix A) and return it to Mr G as outlined in the Communications Section. The supplemental information package will not be distributed prior to the receipt of the RFP Acceptance and Confidentiality Agreement. Please note this RFP is being extended to Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers.
SCOPE OF SERVICES
Your audit should be conducted in accordance with Canadian Generally Accepted Auditing Standards and will commence with the period ending year end date. The audit will be for the consolidated financial statements of X company.
The mandate will include a review of the interim financial statements for each of the interim periods. For greater clarity, the first interim review would be for the three months ending Date.
The mandate also includes:
The statutory audit of Subsidiary 1, 2, and 3;
Communication of weaknesses found in internal controls during the course of the financial statement audit;
Analysis of accounting questions and issues in the context of the audit;
Review of Management's Discussion and Analysis, Annual Information Form, and Annual Report to the extent required by professional standards;
Review of quarterly report to shareholders (including financial statements and notes); Specified audit procedures for Subsidiary 4 as required by the New York Stock Exchange;
Specified audit procedures and audit report on specified financial information for X Company as required by Industry Association;
Review of audit working papers of Subsidiary 5's external auditors (Audit firm);
Audit of financial statements of Special entity (non-consolidated special purpose entity).
Note: The RFP does not include the audit of Subsidiary 5.
RFP PROCESS DESCRIPTION
The RFP process will be conducted in the following phases: The Selection Committee will make recommendations to the Audit Committee and the Audit Committee will select the external auditor for recommendation to the Board and shareholders.
COMMUNICATIONS
The RFP process will be open and equitable for all firms. We will endeavor to ensure all firms have access to the same information. No information in one proposal will be disclosed to another firm in the RFP process.
Management will be available to answer questions throughout the process. To aid in the informationgathering phase, a schedule of availability with management will be established.
To help ensure an efficient and equitable proposal process, Company X is requesting that each proposing firm comply with the following general guidelines:
All inquiries relating to this proposal process, including arrangements for site visits and interviews, are to be directed to G, VP Finance. He will be your single point of contact. Contacting any other member, officer or director of X Company could lead to disqualification. G's contact information follows:
Contact information
To facilitate the review of the Company's information, a data room will be established at X Company's corporate office located at address. A list of information that will be available in the data room is attached as Part C.
In addition, the following individuals will be available to meet with and provide each firm with their perspective of the critical business issues facing Company X. The individual interviews will be restricted to 30 minutes, unless an alternative time frame has been agreed upon in advance, and no more than three people from your firm should attend each interview. The VP Finance will coordinate the interviews. An itemized fee estimate for the year ended Year 2
An itemized fee estimate for each entity and requirement listed.
References
The Firm shall provide a list of clients (minimum three (3): maximum five (5)) that are significant Companies in Industry X who are currently major accounts of the Firm for services similar or identical to the Services outlined in this RFP. The firm will describe how the services provided to these references are similar to the services proposed to X Company.
The Firm must include the client's company name, address, contact name, telephone number and e-mail address, and the length of the association. The Firm's references will be contacted.
Tax
We would like you to address your view on the nature and extent of work that you could provide for tax compliance or tax planning activities.
Other services offered by your firm
We would like your proposal to include an overview of the other services offered by your firm, remaining independent. Overview could include:
Listing of relevant publications available Summary of relevant training and/or networking opportunities (with locations) offered to your clients
Presentation
The objective of the presentation is to allow you to present your offer for services, respond to the questions from the Selection Committee and allow us to meet your engagement team. Presentations to the Selection Committee are expected to be scheduled for Date with the Board decision to follow on Date.
We request that your oral presentation not exceed 60 minutes. After your presentation, thirty minutes will be allotted for questions and discussion.
EXPECTATIONS
Throughout the auditor/client relationship we expect:
An open and professional rapport with direct access to decision makers for all accounting/auditing matters An efficient and effective risk-based audit process Significant and relevant industry experience of the members of the audit team
As partners or managers assigned to the engagement change over time, the firm will agree to provide resumes of new personnel to ensure that each have the requisite technical knowledge and industry expertise to conduct a thorough and efficient audit All billings will be cleared in advance of submission. All billings should provide a detailed description of the work performed and a summary of the hours and rates billed by person.
The annual audit plan will be reviewed with X Company and its Audit Committee in sufficient detail to allow X Company to understand your audit approach (including the assessment of significant risks) and efficiently prepare for the audit process. We accept the request to present a proposal to provide external audit services to the X Company. We agree to keep in confidence all information received by us in connection with the proposal process, including the Supplemental Information, not to disclose it to third parties, not to use it for any other purpose than for the proposal, and to destroy all paper and electronic information in the event that our firm is not selected to be the independent auditor as a result of this proposal process.
Firm Name:
Partner:
Contact Information:
e-mail:
